開始讀《偉大的博弈》，非常的有趣，對華爾街、對美國的歷史有了不同的認識與感觀，傑斐遜主義與漢密爾頓們的爭鬥（《貨幣戰爭》中幾近完美的傑斐遜是我對這位美國總統的唯一認識），荷蘭人的商業精神（之前提到荷蘭似乎腦子裡就只有鬱金香泡沫），與紐約在金融領域一較高下最終敗北的費城，人性的貪婪與自律。。。怎麼說呢，讓文科生的我感覺有重溫高中歷史的感覺，準確地說應該是金融史，但卻非常的生動有趣，今天只讀了前兩章，明天繼續。
Most institutional investors in the early 1970s, on the other hand, regarded business value as of only minor relevance when they were deciding the prices at which they would buy or sell. This now seems hard to believe. However, these institutions were then under the spell of academics at prestigious business schools who were preaching a newly-fashioned theory: the stock market was totally efficient, and therefore calculations of business value - and even thought, itself - were of no importance in investment activities. (We are enormously indebted to those academics: what could be more advantageous in an intellectual contest - whether it be bridge, chess, or stock selection than to have opponents who have been taught that thinking is a waste of energy)
在20世紀70年代，大多數的機構投資者卻認為商業價值在他們決定買入或賣出的價格時是最無關緊要的因素。這似乎難以置信。然而這些機構卻受知名商學院所提出的理論的蠱惑，其理論為：股票市場是完全有效的，因此對公司價值的計算對於投資毫無用處。（我們非常感激這些學者：無論是橋牌，象棋還是選股方面還有什麼能讓我們更加有利的，當對手被告知思考是一種精力的浪費。）
Through 1973 and 1974, WPC continued to do fine as a business, and intrinsic value grew. Nevertheless, by yearend 1974 our WPC holding showed a loss of about 25%, with market value at $8 million against our cost of $10.6 million. What we had thought ridiculously cheap a year earlier had become a good bit cheaper as the market, in its infinite wisdom, marked WPC stock down to well below 20 cents on the dollar of intrinsic value.
在1973和1974年，WPC繼續表現良好，內在價值不斷增長。然而，1974年我們持有的該公司的股份卻出現25%的損失，相對我們一千多萬的成本而言，市值只有八百萬。我們在一年前認為極便宜的東西變得更加便宜了，因為市場以它無限的智慧使得WPC的股價比起內在價值下降20%。
You know the happy outcome. Kay Graham, CEO of WPC, had the brains and courage to repurchase large quantities of stock for the company at those bargain prices, as well as the managerial skills necessary to dramatically increase business values. Meanwhile, investors began to recognize the exceptional economics of the business and the stock price moved closer to underlying value. Thus, we experienced a triple dip: the company's business value soared upward, per-share business value increased considerably faster because of stock repurchases and, with a narrowing of the discount, the stock price outpaced the gain in per-share business value.
你可以預知令人快樂的結果。Kay Graham，WPC的CEO，有智慧與勇氣在折價基礎上回購公司大量的股票，這也是一種大幅提升公司價值的管理技巧。同時，投資者認識到公司優異的經濟基礎，隨後股價逐步趨近其內在價值。因此我們享有三重好處：公司內在價值飆升，每股價值則因為回購上升的更快，而由於較小的折價，股價的表現超出公司價值的增加。
We hold all of the WPC shares we bought in 1973, except for those sold back to the company in 1985』s proportionate redemption. Proceeds from the redemption plus yearend market value of our holdings total $221 million.
我們持有在1973年購入的所有WPC股份，除了那些在1985年公司按比例回購的部分。贖回股票所得加上市場價值增加帶來的年度收益總數為兩億兩千一百萬。
If we had invested our $10.6 million in any of a half-dozen media companies that were investment favorites in mid-1973, the value of our holdings at yearend would have been in the area of $40 - $60 million. Our gain would have far exceeded the gain in the general market, an outcome reflecting the exceptional economics of the media business. The extra $160 million or so we gained through ownership of WPC came, in very large part, from the superior nature of the managerial decisions made by Kay as compared to those made by managers of most media companies. Her stunning business success has in large part gone unreported but among Berkshire shareholders it should not go unappreciated.
假如我們在1973年年中擁有一千萬的投資於6個媒體公司當中的任何一個，股票現在的價值將會是4到6億元。我們的數以將遠超過市場的表現反映出媒體業優異的表現。而我們通過持有WPC股票而獲得的額外的一億六千萬則在很大一部分程度上是源自Kay做出的本質優於其他媒體業經營者的管理決定。她驚人的商業成功雖然沒有被大篇幅報導但Berkshire的股東卻不該忘記。
Our Capital Cities purchase, described in the next section, required me to leave the WPC Board early in 1986. But we intend to hold indefinitely whatever WPC stock FCC rules allow us to. We expect WPC's business values to grow at a reasonable rate, and we know that management is both able and shareholder-oriented. However, the market now values the company at over $1.8 billion, and there is no way that the value can progress from that level at a rate anywhere close to the rate possible when the company's valuation was only $100 million. Because market prices have also been bid up for our other holdings, we face the same vastly-reduced potential throughout our portfolio.
我們對Capital Cities的購買（後面部分會敘述）使我不得不在1986年離開WPC董事會。但是我們打算無限期持有WPC股份只要FCC允許。我們預期WPC的公司價值將會以合理的速度增長，因為我們知道管理層不僅有能力而且以股東為核心。然而市場現在對公司的股價超過18億，公司的價值很難再以當初市值僅為一億美元時的速度成長。也因為我們其他主要的持股股價大多已經被哄抬上去，所以我們的投資組合很難再像過去一般具有成長潛力。
You will notice that we had a significant holding in Beatrice Companies at yearend. This is a short-term arbitrage holding - in effect, a parking place for money (though not a totally safe one, since deals sometimes fall through and create substantial losses). We sometimes enter the arbitrage field when we have more money than ideas, but only to participate in announced mergers and sales. We would be a lot happier if the funds currently employed on this short-term basis found a long-term home. At the moment, however, prospects are bleak.
你會發現我們在年底持有一大筆Beatrice的股份。這是一種短期套利的持有方式，事實上，只是存放貨幣的場所（儘管不是完全的安全，因為有時候）交易也會發生問題而導致巨大的損失）。我們有時候參與套利當我們手頭現金寬裕的時候，但也只參與那些已經宣佈的併購以及購買案。如果現在短期內被如此利用的資金能夠找到長期的歸宿，我們將無比的高興。然而目前前景是慘淡的。
At yearend our insurance subsidiaries had about $400 million in tax-exempt bonds, of which $194 million at amortized cost were issues of Washington Public Power Supply System (「WPPSS」) Projects 1, 2, and 3. 1 discussed this position fully last year, and explained why we would not disclose further purchases or sales until well after the fact (adhering to the policy we follow on stocks). Our unrealized gain on the WPPSS bonds at yearend was $62 million, perhaps one-third arising from the upward movement of bonds generally, and the remainder from a more positive investor view toward WPPSS 1, 2, and 3s. Annual tax-exempt income from our WPPSS issues is about $30 million.
到年底為止，我們的保險分公司大約持有4億美元的免稅債券，其中大約有一半是華盛頓公用電力系統（「WPPSS」）的1、2、3期債券，我已經在去年詳細介紹這一頭寸，並且解釋了為什麼我們不願在有結果前進一步公開公司的買入或賣出策略（與我們在股票上的策略一致。）年底我們在WPPSS債券上實現的收入為六千兩百萬美元，也許三分之一來自於債券價格的普遍上漲，剩餘的則來自更加積極的1、2、3期WPPSS債券投資者。每年來自WPPSS的免稅收入大約是三千萬美元。
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
資本城/ABC公司
Right after yearend, Berkshire purchased 3 million shares of Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (「Cap Cities」) at $172.50 per share, the market price of such shares at the time the commitment was made early in March, 1985. I've been on record for many years about the management of Cap Cities: I think it is the best of any publicly-owned company in the country. And Tom Murphy and Dan Burke are not only great managers, they are precisely the sort of fellows that you would want your daughter to marry. It is a privilege to be associated with them - and also a lot of fun, as any of you who know them will understand.
年後，Berkshire以每股172.5美元買入三百萬美元的資本城/ABC公司股票，這一價格是1985年三月初承諾的。我已經追蹤注意資本城的管理層很多年：我認為其是這個國家上市公司中最優秀的。Tom Murphy和Dan Burke不僅是偉大的經理人，而且是那種你會想把自己的女兒嫁給他的一類人，跟他們一起合作是在是我的榮幸，也相當愉快，如果各位有誰認識瞭解他們將會理解我的想法。
Our purchase of stock helped Cap Cities finance the $3.5 billion acquisition of American Broadcasting Companies. For Cap Cities, ABC is a major undertaking whose economics are likely to be unexciting over the next few years. This bothers us not an iota; we can be very patient. (No matter how great the talent or effort, some things just take time: you can't produce a baby in one month by getting nine women pregnant.)
我們的股票購買幫助資本城能夠獲得35億收購美國廣播公司的資金。對於資本城而言，收購ABC是一大項目，其效益在近些年可能不會太好。但這不會使我們煩惱；我們會非常有耐心。（不管多麼有才能或者多麼努力，很多事需要花費時間：就算你讓9個女人同時懷孕，但是也不可能在一個月生出小孩。）
As evidence of our confidence, we have executed an unusual agreement: for an extended period Tom, as CEO (or Dan, should he be CEO) votes our stock. This arrangement was initiated by Charlie and me, not by Tom. We also have restricted ourselves in various ways regarding sale of our shares. The object of these restrictions is to make sure that our block does not get sold to anyone who is a large holder (or intends to become a large holder) without the approval of management, an arrangement similar to ones we initiated some years ago at GEICO and Washington Post.
作為我們信心的證據，我們簽訂了一向不同尋常的協議：在一定期間內，Tom，作為CEO（或者Dan，如果他接任CEO的話）將代我們執行股票權利。這項協議是Charlie和我提出的，而不是Tom提出的。我們也限制我們在賣出股票方面的各種途徑。這些限制是為了確保在沒有管理層的支持時我們的股票不會被賣給那些持有更多股份的股東（或者是想成為大股東），同我們一年前與GEICO和華盛頓郵報簽訂的協議類似。
Since large blocks frequently command premium prices, some might think we have injured Berkshire financially by creating such restrictions. Our view is just the opposite. We feel the long-term economic prospects for these businesses - and, thus, for ourselves as owners - are enhanced by the arrangements. With them in place, the first-class managers with whom we have aligned ourselves can focus their efforts entirely upon running the businesses and maximizing long-term values for owners. Certainly this is much better than having those managers distracted by 「revolving-door capitalists」 hoping to put the company 「in play」. (Of course, some managers place their own interests above those of the company and its owners and deserve to be shaken up - but, in making investments, we try to steer clear of this type.)
因為巨額股票交易經常造成溢價，有些人可能會認為我們制定這樣的限制條款損害了Berkshire的利益。我們的觀點則剛剛好相反。我們認為對這些公司而言長期的經濟前景，同時也是對我們股東，會因為管理而大大提升。有這樣的條款，一流的經理人與我們形成同盟，可以將其精力完全投入到企業經營上而從長期來看最大化股東價值。這當然比讓這些經理人因為股東的進進出出而分心。（當然有些經理人將其利益放在公司和股東利益之上，他們應該被炒，但是在投資的時候，我們會儘量避開這類經理人。）
Today, corporate instability is an inevitable consequence of widely-diffused ownership of voting stock. At any time a major holder can surface, usually mouthing reassuring rhetoric but frequently harboring uncivil intentions. By circumscribing our blocks of stock as we often do, we intend to promote stability where it otherwise might be lacking. That kind of certainty, combined with a good manager and a good business, provides excellent soil for a rich financial harvest. That's the economic case for our arrangements.
今天企業的不穩定性是股權過分分散所導致的一種不可避免的結果。大股東隨時可能出現，通常滿花言巧語但實際卻不懷好意。憑藉我們所持有的股票我們想要提升可能缺失的穩定性。這種確定性，再加上優秀經理人以及良好的業務，將提供給我們一塊財務的沃壤。這就是我們在經營上的安排。
The human side is just as important. We don't want managers we like and admire - and who have welcomed a major financial commitment by us - to ever lose any sleep wondering whether surprises might occur because of our large ownership. I have told them there will be no surprises, and these agreements put Berkshire's signature where my mouth is. That signature also means the managers have a corporate commitment and therefore need not worry if my personal participation in Berkshire's affairs ends prematurely (a term I define as any age short of three digits).
人性的一面同樣重要。我們不希望我們所喜歡和敬服的經理人，在歡迎我們的投資後，會在一覺醒來擔心是否會因為我們成為大股東而發生什麼意外。我曾告訴過他們不會有意外，而這些協議使得我做出的承諾變成Berkshire的簽字。這些協議使得這些經理人有了來自公司的承諾，因此不用擔心因為我個人在Berkshire的任職過早的結束。（是說我活不到百歲。）
Our Cap Cities purchase was made at a full price, reflecting the very considerable enthusiasm for both media stocks and media properties that has developed in recent years (and that, in the case of some property purchases, has approached a mania). it's no field for bargains. However, our Cap Cities investment allies us with an exceptional combination of properties and people - and we like the opportunity to participate in size.
我們以全價購買資本城的股票，反映出媒體股票以及媒體業在近幾年的蓬勃發展（在一些公司的股票上表現的幾近瘋狂）。這不是一個存在折價的領域。然而我們資本城的投資卻與優秀的資產和管理層相結合，而且我們很高興能夠有機會大規模的投資。
Of course, some of you probably wonder why we are now buying Cap Cities at $172.50 per share given that your Chairman, in a characteristic burst of brilliance, sold Berkshire's holdings in the same company at $43 per share in 1978-80. Anticipating your question, I spent much of 1985 working on a snappy answer that would reconcile these acts.A little more time, please.
當然有些人可能會奇怪為什麼我們以172.5美元每股的價格購買資本城的股票，因為你們形象光輝的董事長，在1978-80年間以每股43美元的價格賣掉該公司的股票。想到這些問題，我花了很多的時間想到一個即刻可以解釋這些行為的答案。所以請再給我多一些的時間思考。